CO129-018 - Others - 1846 — Page 497

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REPORT ON

the northern ports against the monsoon has been purposely magnified by those engaged in the opium trade, who have for several years past navigated the whole coast of China, regardless of the monsoon. Cap- 'tains of merchant-vessels declare they would rather proceed from Hong Kong to Chusan in the north-east monsoon, than they would pass through the English Channel in winter.

A vessel proceeding from Singapore, or any southern port up the China Sea, against the monsoon, can reach Chusan as easily as Hong Kong, and within three or four days of the time, the difference of dis- tance being only 700 miles". The China coast, as far north as Chusan, and the entrance of the Yang-tze-kiang river, is hold, steep, and skirted with islands, where good anchorage may always be found.

The harbour of Chusan is superior to that of Hong Kong, more easy of access and egress in all winds, and safer in a typhoon. No gale can raise a sea in Chusan harbour. The holding ground is a tena- cious clay; and when the junks are driven on shore, owing to their imperfect moorings, they drive on a mud-bank, from whence they easily get off in fine weather. Sixty sail of British vessels have anchored in Chusan harbour at once; and the adjacent safe and large harbour, termed "Spithead," would contain treble that number of vessels. Ex- cellent anchorage exists throughout the whole Chusan archipelago, which is accessible to vessels proceeding in any direction to or from Chusan.

It is worthy of note that, for a large part of the year, Chusan is to windward of the adjacent ports and mainland of China, so that ships of war or transports can at any period with certainty enter the Yang-tze- kiang in a few days after leaving Chusan harbour. Naval commanders will immediately perceive the great importance of such an advantage.

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* One of the erroneous ideas entertained respecting Chusan was the impracti- cability of vessels reaching the island against the monsoon. The monsoons only blow in the tropics, and Hong Kong is on their verge. It is true the wind blows for a long period of the year (from Oct. to May) down the Formosa channel; but vessels at this season go outside the channel, but sometimes beat through: for instance, the

Omega," a small schooner commanded by Captain White, one of the most intelligent, enterprising, and skilful officers on the coast of China, left Chusan, June 13, 1843, went to Hong Kong and Macao, delivered her downward and received her upward cargo, and arrived in Chusan harbour on the 29th, being somewhat under sixteen days. This was thought much of at the time; but in June, 1844, answers to letters were received, by sailing-vessels, from Hong Kong, in nine days from the time of their being written in Chusan. In 1843, Captain White made, in less than nine months, seven sailing voyages up and down between Chusan, Hong Kong and Macao, and on two of these occasions proceeded up the Yang-tze-kiang river as far as Woosung, besides, on other occasions, touching at the ports along the coast. During the remainder of the year the vessel was either laying up or being repaired; had she been constantly running, Captain White says he could have made ten voyages with ease. Let it be remembered that this was a trading schooner obliged to take in and discharge cargo each voyage. On May 6, 1843, at noon, the "Omega" sailed from Dear island, Chusan, and in sixty-nine hours anchored in the Typa, Macao roads. Small British vessels, brigs and schooners, are now plying the whole year between Macao, Canton, and Hong Kong to Chusan and the northern ports. Under a proper treaty and freedom, there would be a very large coasting trade along the whole shore of China con- ducted in small British square-rigged vessels.

CHUSAN.

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Military Position.-A glance at the map of China will instantly demonstrate the many advantages which Chusan possesses as a military station. Midway between the northern and southern extremities of this immense empire; at the entrance of the vast Yang-tze-kiang, which divides China into two parts, and by means of the extraordinary canals all centering in this river, affording a cheap and ready water com- munication with Pekin and all the richest cities and most fertile plains, --sufficiently distant from the mainland to prevent observation, and to guard against a surprise; in a healthy climate, abounding in commissariat supplies, and with the most important maritime advantages, Chusan may justly be termed the key of China.

Two regiments, a couple of frigates, and two steamers, would be sufficient, if stationed at Chusan, not only to keep the whole of the empire of China in check, but even to act on the offensive, enter the Yang-tze-kiang, occupy the mouth of the Grand Canal, and in one week dictate terms of peace without seeking any reinforcements from India. A flat country, thickly peopled by an unwarlike, effeminate, and commercial race, collected in numerous large cities, can never resist even a small well-organized invading body.

But our military occupation of Chusan would tend to prevent war, The Tartar Govern- and to preserve our trade and position inviolate. ment, conscious of its weakness, and of our superior skill in arms, would dread an encounter, when we were at their door immediately to confront them, and demonstrate that we were not again going to waste our time and strength at the southern extremity of the empire. Our very prox- imity to Pekin would make the Chinese Government more solicitous for the maintenance of good faith, and for the preservation of a friendly alliance. We have at present nothing to expect from China but through their fear of our military strength; and were that fear removed, I believe they would not hesitate to expel us from every port in China. I will not advert to Hong Kong; my report on that settlement will show that that island can never be viewed as a military position for Great Britain.

In adverting to the chances of renewed hostilities in China, the prohability of the western nations making this coast their battle-field, as was formerly the case in India, should not be overlooked. France or America or Russia might be engaged in war with China, while we were neutrals; the great value of our occupation of Chusan would then be most manifest. Or should China seek and obtain the assistance of England to quell domestic rebellion, or to resist foreign aggression, our position at the centre region of China would be equally useful. Whether England be engaged in an European or a Chinese war, her military and naval occupation of Chusan would be of vital importance, and the saving of many lives and much treasure.

It is a good maxim, that to be always prepared for hostilities is a This rule would be found most appli- sure mode of preserving peace. cable to the Chinese; and if our policy be the maintenance and exten- sion of social and commercial intercourse with China, England will not relinquish her naval and military position in Chusan.

Concluding Observations against the Evacuation of Chusan by England.-A careful reflection on the policy of the Tartar Govern-

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